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NO PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE IRAQI KURDS UNDER THE 
BA’ATH, SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND ISIS
CRAIG DOUGLAS ALBERT, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Kurds are the largest ethnonational group without their own 
state.1 They are often considered a people in search of their homeland or a 
people without a state.2 Although Kurds are situated in four distinct 
states—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—the largest swath of Kurdish territo-
ry, referred to as “Kurdistan,” is in Iraq.3 It is in this region where some of 
the most egregious crimes against the dignity of an ethnic people have been 
committed.
This paper argues that Iraq has violated Kurdish dignity throughout 
recent history by utilizing examples from three main phases of disposses-
sion: Iraq’s Ba’athist’s attempts to “Arabize” or “Iraqify” the Kurds 
through the 1970s; Saddam Hussein’s efforts to eradicate the Kurds 
through the 1980s, culminating with the al-Anfal campaigns; and presently, 
the Islamic State’s (ISIS) bid to gain control of Kurdish territory, and the 
Iraqi government’s inability to protect the Kurds from ISIS. It uses this 
historical structure to show that the Iraqi treatment of Kurds has been pur-
poseful and systematic. This paper asserts two main points: first, it con-
firms that the case of the Iraqi Kurds constitutes an example of a dignity 
taking, adding breadth and depth to the burgeoning field of dignity takings; 
second, it seeks to expand upon the notion that the denial of self-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Augusta University. Dr. Albert received his B.A. in Political 
Science at Augusta State University in 2001. He received his M.A./Ph.D. from the University of Con-
necticut, 2009. Dr. Albert’s area of concentrations were International Relations, specifically ethnic 
conflict, as well as American Politics. He publishes frequently on ethnic conflict and the Scholarship of 
Teaching and Learning. In 2013, he testified before a joint sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the US Congress on the Threat of Chechen Extremism. He currently directs the Model 
United Nations Program for Augusta University. The author wishes to thank his research assistants 
during the course of this project: Kirsten Fitzgerald; Charles Murdorf; Emily Williamson; and in 
memory of Rowan Feldhaus. You may follow Dr. Albert on Twitter and Facebook: @DrCraigDAlbert.
1. Sarah Leduc, The Kurds: The World’s Largest Stateless Nation, FRANCE 24 (July 30, 2015), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150730-who-are-kurds-turkey-syria-iraq-pkk-divided 
[https://perma.cc/NU62-M8FP] .
2. See generally KEVIN MCKIERNAN, THE KURDS: A PEOPLE IN SEARCH OF THEIR HOMELAND
4 (2006) (“[T]he Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state.”).
3. DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 3 (3d ed. 2004).
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determination is a dignity taking. Further, it contends that the denial of self-
determination to a particular group with the will and capacity for self-
governance should be included as an example of infantilization.
II. DIGNITY TAKINGS EXPANDED: SELF-DETERMINATION AS 
INFANTILIZATION
Although the concept of a dignity taking is relatively new to the tak-
ings literature, it has already achieved substantial scholarly impact. Berna-
dette Atuahene originally defined dignity takings as occurrences “when a 
state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from 
owners or occupiers whom it deems to be sub persons without paying just 
compensation or without a legitimate public purpose.”4 Atuahene concep-
tualizes sub persons as those who are infantilized or dehumanized.5 The
processes of dehumanization and infantilization seek to deny recognition of 
an individual or group’s humanity or full mental capacity.6 In a recent arti-
cle, Atuahene updated her conceptualization, identifying that “[a] dignity 
taking occurs when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates 
property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or uninten-
tional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.”7
Dehumanization is the state’s failure to recognize either an individual 
or a group’s humanity.8 In other words, a dehumanized person’s being or
essence is invisible, and the person is classified as an unfit participant of 
the social contract.9 Dehumanization can result from an outright denial of 
an individual or group’s humanity, for example, by equating them to ani-
mals, insects, or inanimate objects.10 For example, this can be seen in 
commonly reported claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin degraded 
Chechens in exclaiming that he would “flush them all down the toilet,” 
which symbolically relegates Chechens to nothing more than human ex-
4. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 3 (2014).
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id.
7. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical 
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; see also 
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involun-
tary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
8. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31 (“When an individual or community’s humanity is invisible, 
they are no longer regarded as humans having the mental acumen, soul, or agency necessary to enter 
into the social contract.”).
9. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 7, at 801.
10. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31. 
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crement.11 Similarly, Atuahene asserts that “[d]ehumanization will result 
from the use of deadly force since death is the most extreme form of extin-
guishing one’s humanity.”12
Infantilization, on the other hand, restricts an individual or group’s au-
tonomy through the refusal to acknowledge and respect its full capacity to 
reason.13 This is most clear when a regime refuses to acknowledge a person 
or group’s capacity for autonomy and self-governance.14 Accordingly, alt-
hough an individual or group’s humanity is recognized, their ability to de-
termine their own future, through autonomous rule, is not. In these 
instances, individuals are kept under the authority of another without con-
sent or through forced consent. Atuahene clarifies the concept poignantly: 
“Most commonly, infantilization involves treating adults as if they were 
minors, and thus placing them under the authority of another. The social 
contract requires an individual’s consent to be governed, so until children 
develop the mental faculties necessary to consent, they are unequal citi-
zens.”15
Dehumanization is based upon the loss of human worth whereas in-
fantilization is the restriction or denial of autonomy based upon the rejec-
tion of one’s capacity to reason.16 As so conceptualized, this paper 
confirms the Iraqi Kurds as suffering a dignity taking because the Iraqi 
state has systematically and involuntarily taken property from the Kurds, 
while also denying these individuals’ humanity and worth. Kurds in Iraq 
have the unlucky distinction of facing both dehumanization and infantiliza-
tion from the Iraqi regime. As evinced below, the Iraqi regime systemati-
cally removed Kurds from their property without just compensation and 
consent, and Iraq’s Kurdish population has continuously been the victim of 
indiscriminate mass killing, ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide. These 
acts clearly fit within Atuahene’s understanding of dehumanization and 
closely resemble her example of communist-era expropriations to the ex-
tent that communist regimes systematically used deadly force to carry out 
forced transfers of property.17 Furthermore, Iraq has failed to grant Kurdi-
11. Putin’s Chechen Remark Causes Stir, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2460305.stm [https://perma.cc/5JXW-5UMX].
12. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31.
13. Id. at 32. 
14. Id.
15. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 32.
16. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 7, at 801.
17. ATUAHENE, supra 4, at 31–32 (“[A]lthough the stated purpose of most communist-era expro-
priations was to redistribute property and to create egalitarian societies—to the extent that communist 
states systematically used deadly force to carry out the forced transfers of property—dehumanization 
occurred.”). 
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stan full sovereignty and, in most cases, autonomous self-rule despite the 
fact that the region and its inhabitants have expressed a willingness and 
capacity for self-governance.18 Currently under threat from ISIS, Iraq has 
been unable or unwilling to protect its own population, let alone the Kurds. 
Iraq’s reliance on the Kurds to fight their own military campaign against 
ISIS and simultaneous refusal to grant the Kurds more autonomy or out-
right sovereignty is, at worst, active infantilization and, at best, passive 
infantilization.
Infantilization’s meaning ought to include a state’s active or passive 
denial of a group’s right to self-determination when a willingness and ca-
pacity to self-govern is present. If a people wish to govern themselves and 
can do so without creating the conditions for a failed or rogue state, then 
denying this right (especially in the case of ethnonational groups that have 
a distinct identity) denigrates that group’s capacity, and hence rationality, 
for self-rule. Unless the regime can justify that a failed state or rogue state 
is likely to result from the recognition of another group’s self-
determination—therefore likely to cause more conflict, death and destruc-
tion—then not granting that right is a clear violation of human dignity.
Expanding the concept to the denial of self-determination also fits 
within the original depth of Atuahene’s conceptualization of infantilization 
as demonstrated when she writes, “infantilization involves treating adults 
as if they were minors, and thus placing them under the authority of anoth-
er.”19 In this case, a regime is treating an entire ethnonational group as if it 
were a minor, not having the capacity or reason to effectively self-govern. 
Because the Kurds have suffered involuntary property loss (including phys-
ical structures, ancestral territory, and ownership of the self), mass killings, 
and the denial of self-determination, Kurdistan clearly exists as an illustra-
tive case-study of when a dignity taking has occurred. The Iraqi regime has 
systematically played the role of an authoritative adult, and the Iraqi Kurds 
represent the non-consenting minor. Under this view, it becomes clear that 
the denial of national self-determination is a form of infantilization.
Self-determination is generally conceptualized as groups comprising 
ethnic nations that exist under the sovereignty of another entity and that 
seek greater self-rule, autonomy, or independence.20 The concept implies a 
group’s capacity, willingness, and ability to be self-governed. Self-
18. See generally MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 323–40 (discussing the history of Kurdish at-
tempts at autonomous self-government in Iraq between 1968 through 1975). 
19. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 32.
20. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil 
War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes, 50 J. PEACE RES. 291, 292 (2013).
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determination concerns a controlled group seeking to gain control of its 
destiny from an authoritative center that is reluctant to resolve the claims of 
the group in question.21 To understand the denial of national autonomy as a 
form of infantilization, the national right to self-determination must be 
clearly situated in the context of human rights and international law. In 
other words, self-determination must be recognized as a basic human right 
as codified by the Charter of the United Nations (1947), which declares 
self-determination as a necessary condition for universal peace.22 In its 
purpose and principles, the UN Charter asserts, as its second purpose, “[t]o 
develop friendly relations among nationals based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”23 The United Na-
tions further elaborates on the concept of inherent right of national self-
determination in its Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.24
This declaration on principles of international law refers to the sover-
eign’s requirement to respect a people’s right to self-determination in non-
ambiguous terms. It states, “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any 
forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence.”25 This right to self-
determination is further codified in international law through the UN Dec-
laration of Indigenous Rights, which ensures indigenous peoples the right 
of self-determination within existing states; protections against genocide 
and ethnocide; protections for their own cultures, institutions of govern-
ance, special relationship to the land, and traditional economic activities; 
and representation on all bodies making decisions about them.26 Although 
one can debate what groups qualify as ingenious versus a national minority 
versus a stateless nation, international law categorically rejects any dis-
crimination or repression of these individuals and requires a state to protect 
collective group rights.
If it is a duty of the sovereign to allow self-determination, then deny-
ing that right without reason conflicts with international law. Philosophical-
21. Id.
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶2.
23. Id.
24. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
25. Id.
26. Prosper Nobirabo Musafiri, Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Towards 
Theorisation of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples/National Minority? 19 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP 
RTS. 481, 492 (2012).
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ly, protecting this right maintains a sovereign’s legitimacy. If the sovereign 
denies this right and seeks to impose its will with force upon its own people 
in violation of self-determination, it loses legitimacy. A national minority 
or indigenous group (including ethnonational groups), as Musafiri writes, 
has “a right to self-governance in circumstances where the dominant cul-
ture would otherwise conflict with their own.”27 Thus, it is a well-
established concept in international law that a people have the right to self-
determination. As Juan Carlos de las Cuevas explains, “international law 
seems to accord a great deal of recognition to the principle of self-
determination, by granting this right to all of mankind and forbidding states 
from departing from it.”28 Of course, there has been considerable academic 
and diplomatic debate about how and when a people should be allowed 
self-determination, especially when doing so may create instability, con-
flict, and war or when it is deemed that a people are not capable of self-
governance.29 Many critics blame self-determination for instigating violent 
conflict—especially when self-governance would result in a failed or rogue 
state.30
Self-determination has it limits, however. Especially when achieving 
it involves violence. Velasco writes, “[t]he tragedy of human history, how-
ever, is that secessionist aspirations have often incarnated in violent form; 
and self-determination has been blamed for fueling the violence.”31 How-
ever, this paper is arguing for self-determination when there is a willing-
ness and a capacity for self-governance and doing so would not create war. 
Moreover, when a regime is already at war against a people, refusal to 
grant self-determination is beyond rationality because no valid argument 
can be made that doing so will create undue conflict. Thus, it is a form of 
infantilization and an affront to human dignity not to grant self-
determination in these instances of deadly conflict.
When a people desire self-determination, the denial or refusal of that 
right is a clear example of infantilization, and it further develops Atua-
hene’s original conceptualization of infantilization. To then deny self-
determination to any group that has the capability and willingness to self-
27. Id. at 532.
28. Juan Carlos de las Cuevas, Comment, Exceptional Measures Call for Exceptional Times: The 
Permissibility under International Law of Humanitarian Intervention to Protect a People’s Right to 
Self-Determination, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 491, 500 (2015).
29. Kyle Beardsley et al., Resolving Civil Wars before They Start: The UN Security Council and 
Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes, 47 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 675, 675 (2015).
30. Id. at 677.
31. Zoilo A. Velasco, Self-Determination and Secession: Human Rights-Based Conflict Resolu-
tion, 16 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 75, 77 (2014).
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govern is to deny a basic human right and should be an instance of a digni-
ty taking, specifically as a form of infantilization. The foundation for this 
has already been discussed by Richland, who argues that a group’s dignity 
“is to be found in precisely the place they have always insisted it is—in 
their (self-) determination.”32 In fact, Richland goes so far as to say that, in
the case of the Hopi people, proper “reparations” or dignity restoration—
explained below—can happen only when a nation’s inherent sovereignty is 
recognized.33 Richland believes that the U.S.’s disparate acts of disposses-
sion and the failure to recognize the self-determination of the Hopi people 
forms a pattern of ongoing indignity and dispossession and thus should be 
characterized as dignity takings.34 In this Article, I will build upon his con-
tribution.
III. THE DEHUMANIZATION AND INFANTILIZATION OF THE IRAQI
KURDS
A. Ba’athist Arabization of Kurdistan in the 1970s
Much of the antagonism between the Kurds and Iraq results from ar-
guments over Kurdistan’s vast oil reserves.35 The point of contention has 
generally followed a pattern: the Kurds negotiate for autonomy to control 
and have greater access to Kurdistan’s oil; negotiations falter and eventual-
ly lead to rebellion and conflict; the Iraqi regime pursues harsh policies 
against Kurdish rebels and civilians; and then argues that it will maintain 
the Kurdish lands as a punishment against the Kurdish rebellion. Eventual-
ly, Kurdish politicians start a movement toward negotiation, and the cycle 
begins again. Baghdad, throughout its regime cycles in the twentieth centu-
ry, has used two main arguments to deny Kurdistan full autonomy: first, a 
divided Kurdistan would hinder the Iraqi nationalist movement, which 
sought to create a greater Iraq that would be the center of the Arab world.36
This mirrored similar Arabization policies throughout the Middle East in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Second, and perhaps more practically, Iraq wanted to 
32. Justin B. Richland, Dignity as (Self-) Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the Face of US 
Dispossessions, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 917, 922 (2016).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 934.
35. Erin Banco, The Curse of Oil in Iraqi Kurdistan, GLOBAL POST INVESTIGATIONS (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://gpinvestigations.pri.org/the-curse-of-oil-in-iraqi-kurdistan-1c9a9a18efd1 
[https://perma.cc/U6AT-YMT3].
36. Craig Douglas Albert, A History of Violence: Ethnic Group Identity and the Iraqi Kurds, 17 
IRAN & CAUCASUS 215, 217 (2014).
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maintain control of the economic potential of Kurdistan. The Ba’athist 
Revolution of July 1968 illustrates this process.
The Ba’ath Party took power from the Qasim Regime that had con-
trolled Baghdad since its own July Revolution of 1958.37 The Ba’ath Party 
held a radical Arabist ideology partly founded upon hostility toward non-
Arab Kurds, who are culturally and linguistically related to the Persians.38
The Ba’ath Party also sought to secure its newfound position in Baghdad 
and therefore sought cooperation with the Kurds.39 Taking advantage of a 
potential ethnic-civil war between Kurdish groups in the late 60s and early 
70s, and needing to quickly consolidate its position, the Ba’ath, under the 
direction of Saddam Hussein (who was then second-in-command of Iraq), 
reached a peace accord with Kurds.40 The March 11, 1970 peace accord, 
known as the “March Manifesto,” established the cornerstone for future 
relations between the Kurds and Iraq41 and recognized the dignity of the 
Kurds, if only briefly. By most accounts, the peace accord was not a 
Ba’athist attempt to legitimize the Kurds’ autonomy but rather a plan to co-
opt them until the party fully securitized its position.42 This accord is an 
instance of infantilization. Saddam pretended to recognize the Kurds’ right 
to self-rule while the maneuver actually bought time to better situate Ba’ath 
forces to assert authority and dominance over Kurdish lands and people. 
However, much worse was to come.
The peace accord quickly collapsed, partly due to burgeoning Kurdish 
alliances with Iraqi enemies, certain Kurdish elitist insistence on greater 
independence, and the Ba’athist rejection of Kurdish nationalism. The Iraqi 
regime seemingly tried once more to establish a permanent agreement on 
federal relations with Kurdistan by publishing the Autonomy Law of 
1974.43 However, rival Kurdish organizations could not agree on the law’s 
terms.44 Some argued it was the closest Kurdistan had ever come to self-
37. Id.
38. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
THE KURDS (1993), https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/i/iraq/iraq.937/anfalfull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SYQ4-X3LJ].
39. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 324–25. 
40. Id. at 326–28. 
41. Id. at 327 (“The accord reached and issued on 11 March as the government’s policy on the 
Kurdish issue . . . has remained the Kurds’ favoured foundation stone for future relations with the rest 
of Iraq.”).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 335–37 (“The terms of the Autonomy Law set out the Baath position, one that went 
further than any previous legislation, but which fall short of Kurdish demands regarding Kirkuk and 
regarding the real seat of power.”).
44. See id. at 335–36 (discussing how provisions of the Autonomy Law allowed Baghdad to 
retain powers that could effectively strip the Kurds of self-control).
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actualization, while others believed that it did not go far enough in recog-
nizing Kurdish self-determination and that it was dictatorially implement-
ed.45 After its proposal, Saddam Hussein gave the Kurds two weeks to 
accept the Autonomy Law.46 The Kurdish factions could not agree and war 
broke out in 1974 and 1975.47 Finally, during the war and its aftermath, 
Iraq began the dispossession of its Kurdish population to resolve its Kurd-
ish problem.
The tyrannically imposed Autonomy Law appeared to grant substan-
tial autonomy to the Kurds, but it actually centralized power, even in the 
autonomous zones throughout Kurdistan. Put simply, the law created more 
control disguised as autonomy. Yildiz argues that the law’s autonomous 
region accounted for less than half of what the Kurds recognized as Kurdi-
stan.48 It created legal limitations that substantially qualified autonomy. 
Central authority figures were authorized to give general guidance to local 
Kurdish officials, and perhaps the most telling was a state minister being 
authorized to attend all meetings of all autonomous bodies.49 Further, all 
decisions made by local Kurdish bodies could be contested by Iraq’s Minis-
ter of Justice and could be suspended by the Iraqi Court of Cassation.50
Taken together, these qualifications of the Autonomy Law of 1974 
highlight why the law’s label was nothing but a misnomer. It clearly 
demonstrated the Ba’athist contempt for Kurdish autonomy and their belief 
that the Kurds lacked the capacity for self-governance. Certainly, from 
Iraq’s perspective, Iraq was attempting to parent its unruly children. To 
make matters worse, the Ba’ath enacted this law after the Kurds believed 
they were making headway with the Kurdish rights outlined in the March 
Manifesto. The unilateral implementation of the Autonomy Law of 1974
was a dignity taking disguised as a “dignity giving” spectacle.
The war and its immediate effects are clear examples of the dehuman-
ization that accompanies dignity takings. Iraq went to war with more than 
90,000 fighters, 1200 tanks and armored cars, and 200 aircraft.51 Kurdish
forces numbered about 60,000 Peshmerga, or guerilla fighters (literally 
45. See id. at 337 (“They and others joined the National Front in Baghdad, arguing that the Au-
tonomy Law was the best they could hope for and should be supported. Other Leftist Kurds believed 
that Saddam Husayn was no longer serious about an agreement. The Autonomy Law, for them, was by 
dictat.”).
46. KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS IN IRAQ: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 20 (2004).
47. See MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 337–38.
48. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 21.
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 23.
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translated as those who confront death), and about the same number of 
irregular forces, all temporarily supported with Iranian artillery and anti-
tank missiles.52 The Kurds’ only chance to defend their territory was with 
the help of Iran and hope of assistance from the United States. U.S. assis-
tance never came. Iraq and Iran eventually negotiated the Algiers Agree-
ment of 1975, which ended Iran’s support of the Kurds, and settled other 
non-Kurdish related issues between the two states.53 Iraqi forces took im-
mediate advantage of this.
The Iraqi army created a security zone surrounding Kurdish regions 
bordering Turkey, Syria, and Iran, measuring 600 miles in length54 and
about 19 miles deep.55 Within this security zone, the Iraqi military de-
stroyed an estimated 1500 villages.56 Additionally, the Iraqi government 
resettled at least 600,000 people (including women and children) to muja-
ma’at, or collective camps.57 The resettlement campaign deported Kurds 
from their ancestral homelands to Arab dominated areas, and according to 
Human Rights Watch, many Kurds died in the relocation efforts, although 
there are no exact figures available.58 Summary execution without trial 
awaited any Kurd caught inside Kurdistan after resettlement.59
The Iraqi government brought ethnic Arabs into razed Kurdish villag-
es to transition formerly Kurdish provinces into Arab dominated districts. 
The most telling evidence of this displacement includes interviews with 
Arabs who were relocated, sometimes forcibly, into the Kurdish lands. In 
an interview conducted by Human Rights Watch, an Arab tribesman stated:
“We moved because there was an order from the government to move to 
this village. Whether I was happy or unhappy, I had to obey that order. 
During the last regime, if the government gave an order to the people to do 
something, they had to obey.”60 A leader from Kis Qal’a village said:
The eviction and expulsion happened in one day, and on the same day
they brought the Arabs . . . . They came and ordered us to leave Kis 
Qal’a. We could choose where we wanted to go, but the only condition 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23. 
54. Id.
55. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339 (“[T]he regime created a security belt along the Iranian and 
Turkish borders, which progressively widened from 5 km to eventually 30 km in places.”).
56. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 24.
57. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339. 
58. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38.
59. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339 (“Anyone caught returning to their ancestral homesteads 
was summarily executed, without regard for age or sex.”).
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN 
NORTHERN IRAQ 12–13 (2004), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/iraq0804.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/249F-CRZA].
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was that it had to be above the town of Atrush [located inside the then 
just declared Kurdish autonomous zone]. The ones who came to expel us 
were the heads of Shaikhan district, with the police and [Ba’athists]. The 
expulsion was peaceful, but we were ordered to leave.
. . .
We were settled in a remote area . . . . We arrived at the end of April, in a 
field of grass. We had to build our own houses from mud.61
The Ba’ath made it almost impossible to own property deeds in tradi-
tional Kurdish territory. Jaji Muhammad Ya’qub Hussain claims: “There 
were 188 villages in Shaikhan. The government cancelled all of the proper-
ty certificates of the Kurds and the other nationalities in the villag-
es . . . . The law of 1975 Arabized the whole area, and brought the Arabs to 
all of the Kurdish villages.”62 In the most telling example of ethnic dilution 
by the Iraqi regime, the Ba’ath encouraged Arabs to start taking Kurdish 
wives in an attempt at ethnic assimilation or ethnic dispersion, to guarantee 
an Arab majority in all regions and thereby negate the need for Kurdish 
autonomy.63 Additionally, the war created at least 200,000 Kurdish refu-
gees within Iran alone, with an undetermined total killed.64
The Iraqi regime dehumanized the Kurds by creating a security zone, 
forcibly resettling the Kurds, killing all those who refused to obey these 
policies, razing villages, refusing land deeds, and encouraging ethnic as-
similation bordering on ethnic cleansing. The Iraqi regime also demonstrat-
ed its contempt for Kurdish self-rule by refusing their rights to their 
ancestral homeland, refusing greater autonomy, and redrawing traditional 
Kurdish territories and Arabizing the provinces. Each of these policies 
denies the inherent human right of self-determination and forces a group 
wishing for self-governance to live under the authoritative centralized con-
trol of “outsiders.” This is the first occurrence in what has become a pattern 
of dignity takings.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 29. Although the Arabs interviewed believed that the Iraqi government had compen-
sated the Kurds, “[i]n all likelihood, Iraqi government propaganda asserted that all displaced families 
had been compensated, but such compensation did not actually take place.” Id. at 32.
63. See MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 340 (“Other distasteful measures included financial rewards 
to Arabs who took Kurdish wives, a deliberate encouragement of ethnic assimilation, the transfer of 
Kurdish civil servants, soldiers and police out of Kurdistan, the removal of Kurdish faculty from the 
new university in Sulaymaniya and the Arabizing of some place names. Undoubtedly Baghdad also 
resorted to arrests, torture and executions to ensure its writ went unchallenged.”).
64. Id. at 339.
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B. The Spoils (Al-Anfal)
According to McKiernan, Anfal is an Arabic term taken from the 
Quran in which followers of Mohammed raided and pillaged lands of non-
believers; it specifically refers to the spoils of war captured from infidels.65
Al-Anfal represents the culmination of violence against the Kurds by Sad-
dam Hussein, his Tikriti Ba’ath compatriots, and the Iraqi military. Al-
Anfal was Saddam’s attempt to punish the Kurds for their disobedience and 
constant rebellions against his vision for Iraq. Al-Anfal eliminated an esti-
mated 182,000 Kurds.66 The full, eight-phase campaign took place between 
March 1987 and April 1989,67 but the deadliest crimes occurred in 1988. 
The Iraqi regime orchestrated Al-Anfal to suppress ethnic rebellion in 
Northern Iraq and to stop Kurdish fighters from assisting Iran in its war 
with Iraq (1980–1988).68 In effect, the Iraqi regime treated the Kurds as 
animals. As one victim reports: “The Iraqis wanted us to bow down. Sad-
dam, especially, wanted us to bow down like dogs.”69 This report demon-
strates the dehumanization as experienced by the dispossessed.
Al-Anfal’s specific purpose was to cleanse the region of all saboteurs, 
who the regime defined as including all males between the ages of fifteen
and seventy.70 It was Saddam’s attempt to destroy Kurdistan. The statistics 
concerning those killed and the property destroyed by the regime are stag-
gering. Exact figures are disputed, but government forces destroyed any-
where from 300071 to 4000 villages,72 displacing up to 1.5 million Kurds 
either internally or internationally.73 A member of the Kurdish Peshmerga
details his account of the destruction:
Ah, since 1961, we have struggled! We have faced many difficulties. All 
of Saddam’s oppression operations, all the chemical bombings, all the 
mass graves. Many people for example, know of Halapja. No one de-
fended us. More than 5,000 Kurds died at Halapja, from Saddam’s chem-
ical attacks. And there were so many Halapjas. So many villages 
65. MCKIERNAN, supra note 2, at 38.
66. Jennifer Trahan, A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment: Genocide 
Against the Kurds, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (2009).
67. Michael J. Kelly, The Anfal Trial Against Saddam Hussein, 9 J. GENOCIDE RES. 235, 235 
(2007).
68. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 25-26.
69. Hajee Muhammad Abdullah Ismail, The Happy Warrior, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE 
KURDS AFTER SADDAM 34 (Mike Tucker ed., 2004).
70. Carole A. O’Leary, The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects, MIDDLE E. REV.
INT’L AFF., Dec. 2002, at 17, 18.
71. Albert, supra note 36, at 219.
72. DENISE NATALI, THE KURDS AND THE STATE: EVOLVING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN IRAQ,
TURKEY, AND IRAN 58 (2005).
73. Albert, supra note 36, at 219.
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destroyed. So many lives destroyed. The hell of Chemical Ali. And 
Kurdish people are still suffering from diseases and cancer, from Sad-
dam’s chemical attacks.74
The Iraqi elites’ intent was to exterminate the Kurds during Al-Anfal
and to make Kurdistan uninhabitable. One witness of Al-Anfal recounts the 
destruction of land and property:
In 1991, after the safe haven was established in Kurdistan, I returned to 
my village. My village was gone. There was death everywhere. Dead 
sheep and goats. Dead chicken. Dead cattle. All the livestock of the vil-
lage was dead and rotting. And the beautiful stone houses were in ru-
ins . . . . Roofs were torn down and walls shelled, mortared, bulldozed. 
My village was destroyed, like 4,500 other Kurdish villages. And the wa-
ter was poisoned; Saddam poisoned all the wells of my village.75
Ali Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, was in almost total 
command of the campaign; after Al-Anfal, he became known as Chemical 
Ali. In official documents concerning the operations, Iraqi government 
officials made clear that Kurdish villages were to be evacuated (read as 
“cleansed”) and demolished so that no house was left standing.76 Chemical 
Ali allegedly backed up his orders with personal threats, insisting that if he 
found any house intact after the operations, he would hold the section 
commander responsible.77 A Human Rights Watch report details the intent 
and efficacy of Iraqi regime forces. It quotes an intelligence officer:
I got two IFAs [East German-built military trucks] full of explosives 
from a warehouse in Erbil. I commandeered 200 bulldozers from civil-
ians of Erbil—by force, with no payment. We started destroying mud 
villages with bulldozers, and dynamiting the cement structures. We used 
military engineers for this.78
The report also notes that troops entered villages at dawn, filled water 
wells to make them unusable, and destroyed electricity supplies.79 Intelli-
gence officials inspected the villages by helicopter and if any structure 
were still standing, the section commander would have to return to finish 
the job and risk disciplinary action.80 The report stunningly states: “Many 
74. Muhammad Salim Dosky, Fighting Spirit, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS AFTER 
SADDAM, supra note 69, at 29, 31.
75. Ismail, supra note 69, at 33, 35.
76. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 59.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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villages [were] not so much demolished as pulverized.”81 The report also 
states that Kurds were not to be killed unless they actively resisted but, in a 
strange twist of logic, Chemical Ali ordered that, if resistance did occur, the 
entire village and all inhabits were to be killed in reprisals.82 Furthermore, 
the regime prohibited farming and grazing animals in the security zone. 
Regime documents order that any person or animal found in the security 
zone must be killed immediately.83 Fawcett and Tanner note that killings 
were much more regularized than Ali acknowledged.84 They cite regime 
sources that describe the operation’s intent to systematically eliminate peo-
ple and property within the prohibited security villages.85 Ali Hasan al-
Majid admitted that the Iraqi military units would surround and attack vil-
lages, round up and relocate inhabitants, and bulldoze them into mass 
graves.86
Al-Majid states in his own words: “Yes, I’ll certainly look after [the 
Kurds]. I’ll do it by burying them with bulldozers. That’s how I’ll do it.”87
Montgomery publishes accounts of Iraqi officials. One official document 
states: “We are sending to you the families . . . who surrendered to our 
forces in the area of Sofi Raza on April 15, 1988. Please take the necessary 
measures against them according to the directives of the Northern Bureau 
and acknowledge their arrival.”88 Montgomery notes that this document 
identifies the murder of 139 families, 307 individuals.89 After reviewing the 
official Iraqi archives, Montgomery concludes that “necessary measures” 
refers to the execution of captives and notes that the names therein repre-
sent certificates of death for those individuals.90
Iraqi officials attempted to make it impossible for Kurds to return to 
their homes by deploying chemical weapons in up to 250 villages and 
towns in the late 1980s.91 One bystander illustrates the resulting death:
The next day, we moved out. Unbeknownst to us, the area had been pre-
viously attacked by the Iraqis with chemical weapons. One of my grand-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 81.
84. JOHN FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION—SAIS PROJECT ON 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ 9 (2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bruce P. Montgomery, The Iraqi Secret Police Files: A Documentary Record of the Anfal 
Genocide, 52 ARCHIVARIA 69, 70 (2001).
88. Id. at 89.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 84, at 10.
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daughters, and one of my sons, were so very hungry that they tried eating 
wild grass. Then, after several hours, they died clenching their stomachs, 
with boils on their faces.92
According to Human Rights Watch, this was the first instance in histo-
ry where a government used chemical weapons against its own people.93
Many Iraqi Kurds died in the chemical bombardments—innocent civilians 
as well as Kurdish Peshmerga. Another eyewitness recounts:
I had four brothers and three sisters; two sisters and two brothers remain 
alive. Both sisters are lame, from war wounds, suffered when Iraqi 
troops attacked Bawarky in Al Anfal, 1988. One is paralyzed, and the 
other has shrapnel wounds that crippled one of her legs. My paralyzed 
sister went into a state of physical and mental collapse during Al Anfal 
after her two sons died in the Iraqi Army’s chemical attacks on Bawarky. 
All of my family’s sheep and goats—over 1,000, total—died in the same 
chemical attacks.94
In the town of Halapja alone, in March 1988, the Iraqi military used 
multiple chemical weapons including Mustard Gas, Sarin, VX and Tabun, 
which immediately killed 7000 Kurds95 and up to 5000 more from the 
deadly, lingering effects of exposure to chemical weapons.96 Muhammad 
Mala Khader provides a first-hand account of Saddam’s chemical weapons 
usage:
1988, with my men, we were attacked three times with chemical weap-
ons. The Shaqlawa district, near Hawlerr, was the worst for me. I ordered 
my men to wrap themselves in rough burlap bags. We wrapped rags over 
our mouths, our eyes, and our noses. The Iraqi planes came, dropping 
napalm and chemical bombs. There were 300 Kurds in a nearby village. 
One hundred sixty died that day and one hundred forty survived and they 
live today but they are terribly handicapped, with disabilities from the 
chemical weapons.97
The Iraqi military attacked the city from the air using conventional 
cluster bombs indiscriminately, sending fighters and residents underground 
into fallout shelters. The regime then shelled the town with poisonous gas 
that descended underground into the shelters, killing fighters and civilians 
92. Ahmed Hajee Mirkhan Bawarky, Life Must Go On, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS 
AFTER SADDAM, supra note 69, at 15, 20.
93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 27.
94. Bawarky, supra note 92, at 15–16.
95. Kelly, supra note 67, at 237.
96. O’Leary, supra note 70.
97. Muhmmad Mala Khader, The Lion in Winter, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS AFTER 
SADDAM, supra note 69, at 1, 5.
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without distinction.98 Ahmad Bhadey describes his experience of victims 
trapped in the fallout shelters:
I heard the jets before I saw them. The voice of the jets made an explo-
sion in my ears . . . . One jet dove over each village. Each dropped one 
bomb . . . . These were chemical bombs Saddam attacked us with, the 
chemical death. The villagers were crammed together in bomb shelters. 
They died from the chemicals. I, myself, opened the large, heavy wood-
en door to one of the shelters. My Kurdish people lay inside, dead. The 
stench was unbelievable.99
Since the American-led Wars of 1991 and 2003, the Kurds were able 
to turn the tide. After the First Gulf War (1990–1991), the U.S. alliance 
created a safe haven and a no-fly zone in Iraqi Kurdistan. In effect, this 
created a de facto Kurdistan, which formed its own autonomous govern-
ment, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Most of the Iraqi re-
gime’s atrocities ceased after this period, and with the Iraq War (2003–
2011), the Kurds seemed hopeful that they might gain greater autonomy 
and perhaps independence. However, with the government of Iraq con-
trolled by a divisive and non-inclusive leader, Nouri al-Maliki, and with the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, tragedy struck the Kurds once again.
C. The Islamic State and Iraqi Kurds: 2014–Present
The self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) occupies areas in Syria and 
Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, aims to create an Islamic Caliphate 
in the region. ISIS surprised both Kurdish forces and Iraqi regime elements 
by successfully attacking Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. By most ac-
counts, the Iraqi military quickly capitulated and abandoned their posts as 
jihadists advanced.100 Mosul is the largest town bordering the disputed
territories between Kurdistan and Baghdad. The Kurds then had to defend 
both their homeland and the disputed territories (i.e., the territories that 
Kurdistan claims for itself but that Baghdad refuses to grant to them). Iraqi 
regime forces left the Kurds stranded.101 ISIS elements quickly entered 
Kurdish villages and enclaves, leaving the Peshmerga to fight for them-
98. MCKIERNAN, supra note 2, at 39–40.
99. Sanan Ahmed & Ahmad Abdullah Bhadey, Comrades in Arms, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF 
THE KURDS AFTER SADDAM, supra note 69, at 37, 45.
100. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, GUARDIAN (June 10, 
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-
militants-seize-control-mosul [https://perma.cc/X4SM-XNDH].
101. Id.
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selves as the Iraqi military rapidly dissipated.102 The regime seemed inca-
pable of assisting the Kurds, and, according to news reports, entire compa-
nies of Iraqi soldiers hastily left their defensive positions, ran through the 
streets, and disposed of their uniforms (sometimes right down to their un-
dergarments).103 The Iraqi army’s failure caused many Kurdish cities and 
villages to fall into ISIS’s hands or to become contested by ISIS.
In August 2014, ISIS made a huge incursion into Kurdistan, overrun-
ning Kurdish forces in Sinjar and Makhmou, and reaching as far as Gwer, 
fifteen miles from the Kurdish capital of Erbil.104 In the Kurdish city of 
Zumar, the Iraqi military quickly abandoned their posts and allowed ISIS to 
acquire weapons that they then used to kill Kurds.105 The Kurds faced ISIS-
laid IEDs, TNT, and booby traps in Zumar and surrounding villages; as 
Barbarani writes: “A labyrinth of unexploded ordnance was strategically 
placed to wreak havoc among civilians and military personnel.”106 ISIS 
fighters fought with such brutality that Kurdish fighters and civilians lived 
in constant terror, resulting in lower morale: a disease that can cripple mili-
tary forces. ISIS developed an efficient array of tactics including suicide 
bombers, mines, snipers and the use of US equipment captured from the 
Iraqi military by ISIS forces.107
Many Kurds believe that the conflict they now face with ISIS results 
from Baghdad’s policies and the military’s inefficacy. Iraq’s failure to pro-
tect Kurdistan—regarded as intentional by the Kurds108—should qualify as 
a dignity taking. This assertion is bolstered by the fact that although much 
of Baghdad’s economy derives from Kurdish controlled oil, the Kurds 
themselves receive little or no money in return, and the Kurdish govern-
ment has been largely unable to pay its civil servants.109 The Kurds insist 
that Baghdad does not care for their right to self-rule, which is demonstrat-
ed by the lack of economic redistribution from the center to the Kurdish 
periphery that generates much of their wealth in the first place.
102. Dexter Filkins, The Fight of Their Lives, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), 
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[https://perma.cc/SBN7-QRNG].
106. Id.
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ISIS has also dispossessed Kurds. First, ISIS lays claims to Kurdish 
land by arguing that it reserves a right to reclaim all lands that were once 
officially under the control of Islam’s historical Caliphates. Regardless of 
any Kurdish claims to ownership, ISIS does not recognize any other land 
claims than its own. A member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Sa’ed 
Mamuzein, stated, “ISIS terrorists have brought 218 families from Ramadi 
and Beiji to live in Kurdish-Shabak properties surrounding Mosul.”110
Mamuzein continued, “Shabak-Kurds have fled in fear of ISIS, leaving 
behind their belongings which are now seized by ISIS.”111 Rudaw Media 
Network notes that this is ISIS’s attempt at ethnic cleansing around Mosul, 
taking all Kurdish property and lands and giving them to loyal Arabs; a 
policy familiar to the Kurds throughout Iraqi history.112 Other Kurdish 
media outlets report that ISIS members are selling the captured Kurdish 
villages to Arabs for between five and ten thousand U.S. dollars.113 Duman
argues that one possible reason why ISIS is selling villages is to prevent the 
Kurds from ever returning home. One report argues that the war with ISIS 
has caused 372,000 Kurds to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 
with the Kurdish Yazidi minority representing ninety-one percent of that 
number.114 Due to ISIS’s Arabization policies, traditionally Kurdish areas 
now have a higher Sunni Arab presence.115
Second, the violence that ISIS uses to contest and gain back these are-
as is brutal, qualifying as a dignity takings. As Gulmohamad writes: “In 
general, [ISIS] has followed the policy of annihilating any resistance to its 
authority by terrorizing other rebel groups, civil activists[,] and journalists 
with cruel methods.”116 He notes that ISIS has carried out brutal attacks 
against the Kurds in Iraq because the Kurds disobeyed ISIS’s authority by 
trying to help Syrian Kurds that ISIS massacred.117 Most of the dehumani-
zation by ISIS in Kurdistan has been against the Yazidis. ISIS executed 
Yazidis in mass numbers; up to 100,000 men, women, and children fled 
110. ISIS Evicting Kurdish Shabaks from Lands That Are Given to Arab Loyalists, RUDAW (Nov. 
21, 2014), http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/21112014 [https://perma.cc/7YAB-PBKA].
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their homes and were trapped on Mt. Sinjar in Iraq, facing a humanitarian 
disaster.118 According to Fuccaro, Yazidis are the largest heterodox Kurd-
ish group in the Mosul province.119 To ISIS members, Yazidis are slaugh-
tered because they are considered heretical because Yazidi Kurds do not 
believe in the same form of Islam as does ISIS.120 Members of ISIS do not 
respect Yazidis nor think of them as human, and thus slaughter them at 
will. ISIS even attempted acts of genocide of the Yazidis on Mt. Sinjar.
In other ISIS attacks against the Kurds, reports have surfaced of bru-
tality and dehumanizing tactics. Khudhur Rasho witnessed two Yazidi men 
executed and members of ten families, hands bound, taken by ISIS mem-
bers.121 According to the New York Times, Sami Hassan, a Yazidi, was 
working at a hospital when a wounded ISIS member arrived and demanded 
to know which sect he belonged to.122 Hassan reported that he escaped 
through a window while being shot at.123 Presumably, the ISIS member 
wanted to kill Hassan simply because he was a Yazidi Kurd. A Yazidi Min-
ister of Parliament, Vian Dakhil, stated that ISIS was killing men, women, 
and children, and that some women were even being sold into slavery.124
MP Dakhil said: “There is a collective attempt to exterminate the Yazidi 
people.”125 In a report by Amnesty International, a Kurdish man stated:
“They killed the 15 men and took the women and children and until now 
we do not know what happened to them, where they are or if they are dead 
or alive.”126 A Yazidi woman noted her son had been abducted and killed: 
“We have had no news of him since we fled three days ago. If he was alive 
and well he would have contacted us.”127
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To achieve justice where dignity takings have occurred, Atuahene ar-
gues that there must be a comprehensive remedy, which she calls “dignity 
restoration,” that compensates injured parties for both the economic harm 
and the dignity deprivation involved.128 However, as Richland denotes, 
reparation is not always possible without granting full sovereignty to 
groups with collective identities.129
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM DIGNITY TAKINGS TO DIGNITY
RESTORATION
In sum, dignity takings have occurred against the Kurds of Iraq. This 
paper has demonstrated that the Kurds have been the victim of involuntari-
ly property takings in physical structures, in ancestral land attached to their 
cultural identity, and through the denial of self-ownership. The Kurds have 
been the victims of both dehumanization through regime-perpetrated vio-
lence and infantilization by the constant denial of self-rule. I argue that 
failure to grant self-determination constitutes infantilization when three 
conditions are present: 1) the will to self-govern; 2) the capacity to self-
govern; and 3) when no greater conflict will result from granting sovereign-
ty. If any of these three conditions are not present, infantilization has not 
occurred. In these cases, refusing to recognize sovereignty is not a result of 
denying reason and full mental capability to a collective group, but rather it 
is about maintaining some semblance of peace and stability. In 1996, 
Chechnya quickly devolved into a warlord society, with rampant anarchical 
conditions in major cities, resulting in warring factions, mass violations of 
human rights, and the rise of terrorist groups, creating an unstable and inse-
cure environment.130 Partly due to this result, Russia invaded again to re-
store law and order and effectively deny self-determination.131 In this case, 
however, infantilization did not occur because Chechnya did not meet all 
three parameters.
Dignity restoration rests upon the principles of restorative justice; it 
seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed and to reintegrate the group into soci-
ety with an emphasis on process.132 Socio-legal and institutional processes 
on behalf of the regime in power must be put in place to alleviate the dam-
ages done by a regime’s dehumanization and infantilization. Until this res-
toration is achieved, justice remains elusive.
128. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 4. 
129. Richland, supra note 32.
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131. See, e.g., CHECHNYA: FROM PAST TO FUTURE (Richard Sakwa ed., 2005).
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Perhaps the most appropriate dignity restoration is for the Iraqi regime 
and the international community to recognize a sovereign Kurdish nation-
state. The current constitution of Iraq already recognizes Kurdish federal 
autonomy, and the Kurds are relatively freer than at any time in Iraq’s con-
temporary memory. Article 117 of Iraq’s constitution reads: “First: This 
Constitution, upon coming into forces, shall recognize the region of Kurdi-
stan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.”133 It further 
validates all decisions and laws passed in Kurdistan since 1992.134 Article
141 reads:
Legislation enacted . . . shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the 
government . . . including court decisions and contracts, shall be consid-
ered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of 
the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided 
that they do not contradict with the Constitution.135
Such language implies that the Iraqi government believes that the 
Kurds are capable of self-rule. In fact, many scholars argue that Kurdistan 
is a de facto independent state.136 For instance, Stansfield argues that “[t]he 
Kurdistan Region has already become a state-like entity” and illustrates 
that Kurdistan has become institutionalized territorially, politically, and 
economically.137 Furthermore, Kelly argues, “Iraqi Kurdistan exists today 
in a de facto sense, but struggles to exist in a de jure sense.”138 Kelly even 
observes that one hardly encounters an Iraqi federal official in Kurdistan, 
noting that even customs issues and border posts are handled by Kurdish 
government officials.139 Furthermore, the Kurdish Peshmerga are the only 
capable military forces defending the Kurds from ISIS, which shows that 
the de facto nature of Kurdistan should become a de jure acceptance.
Most of Iraqi Kurdistan provides for itself economically through agri-
culture and oil wealth.140 However, much of Kurdistan’s oil wealth is left 
untapped as the regional government and the federal regime try to cooper-
ate. There is no final solution as to who should govern Kurdish oil and 
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who—the Kurds or the federal government—should profit from that sup-
ply. However, Voller notes that the Kurds have acted unilaterally concern-
ing its oil reserves in an attempt to consolidate sovereignty and exhibit this 
self-rule to the international community.141 The main source of unilateral 
action stems from Kurdistan’s parliament passing a regional Petroleum 
Law, ratified as the “Hydrocarbon Law” in 2009.142 This law allows the 
Kurdish government to contract independently with international oil com-
panies through Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).143 The Kurds now 
control their oil without needing support, agreement, or cooperation from 
Baghdad.
The Kurdish government has already signed several contracts through 
PSAs, including a substantial contract with ExxonMobil.144 The Kurds 
have asserted their rights to Kirkuk by incorporating these areas in their 
PSAs with foreign firms. Furthermore, the Kurdish government demon-
strates its capacity to govern itself through these unilateral actions. Howev-
er, the Kurds argue their unilateral moves are legitimate, considering that 
the central government is not fulfilling its side of the oil sharing arrange-
ment between the two camps.145
Accordingly, Kurdistan should receive seventeen percent of Iraq’s to-
tal oil revenue, but the Kurdish government contests that it only receives 
between ten and eleven percent.146 Through their PSAs, the Kurds now 
have the capacity to pump approximately 45 billion barrels of oil and 99 to 
201 trillion cubic feet of gas.147 Combined with its military and political 
realities, Kurdistan’s political economy demonstrates that the Kurds al-
ready govern themselves and could be recognized as a sovereign entity by 
the international community as an effort toward full dignity restoration.
As a concept, dignity takings provide a useful framework to view re-
gime practices and processes of dehumanization and infantilization. Digni-
ty takings afford the scholar and practitioner a way to analyze crimes 
against certain individuals or groups of people using a unified socio-legal 
framework. By analyzing the Kurdish case, this essay has further devel-
141. Yaniv Voller, Kurdish Oil Politics in Iraq: Contested Sovereignty and Unilateralism, MIDDLE 
E. POL’Y, Spring 2013, at 68, 68.
142. Id. at 72.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id.
146. See generally David Ottaway & Marina Ottaway, How the Kurds Got Their Way, FOREIGN 
AFF., May/June 2014, at 139.
147. Id.
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oped the concept of infantilization, which is central to the concept of digni-
ty takings.
